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Buying things necessary to the pursuit of other government tasks is a pretty
boring subject. It is not surprising, therefore, that the press reports largely on
the discovery of $450.00 hammers in government tool chests and on the
nefarious activities of the Wed-Techs of the world and their public sector allies.
Media coverage thus encourages Americans to ignore government procurement
or to think of it as both inefficient and corrupt.
Steven Kelman's Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of
Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance, alerts us to another
and potentially more serious problem with public sector procurement activity.
With considerable regularity the government agencies that purchase complex
equipment, computer systems in Kelman's study, do not get what they need.
This poor fit between equipment purchased and perfonnance required results,
however, neither from corruption, nor the willingness of the government to pay
non-competitive prices. On the contrary, Kelman argues, these procurement
failures are the direct result of the rules established to promote open competi-
tion and protect against improper use of public funds. In Kelman's view, the
federal procurement system has largely succeeded in stamping out favoritism
and corruption. But that same system fails miserably as a means for assisting
agencies to achieve excellence in the pursuit of their primary public goals.
I. The Causes of Failure
In more concrete (but vastly oversimplified) terms, the federal government
procurement process features a standard fonn of equipment and services
acquisition-"full and open competition. II Under that system, the government
specifies its requirements in detail and awards its contracts to the bidder who
offers to meet those specifications at the lowest cost. In some sense, the federal
government's procurement policies represent a high achievement in public
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sector management. Federal procurement activity relentlessly pursues the three
goals of equity (fair access to competing bidders), integrity (reduction in
opportunities for corruption) and economy, (obtaining goods or services
required at the lowest possible price). Orientation toward these ideas is support-
ed by an extraordinarily detailed and complex compilation of procurement
regulations as well as by a "procurement culture" that reinforces adherence to
general norms.
Yet, in Kelman's story this system, however well-designed for the pro-
curement of No.2 lead pencils, repeatedly fails to produce good results in the
acquisition of complex computer processing systems. Using a combination of
government and private industry surveys directed to computer managers, and
a series of intensive case studies of computer equipment procurement, Kelman
develops a persuasive explanation for these failures. In a nutshell, the cause is
the system's suppression of the sorts of decision processes and business
relationships that produce the information upon which sensible procurement
judgments might be based. In Kelman's view the government makes bad
decisions both because it is badly informed and because its procurement
officials are encouraged to disregard some of the important information that
they possess. The culprit in both instances is the system of full and open
competition.
Consider the Department of Agriculture. In putting together a massive
computer scheme for all of its field offices, the Department's specifications led
the bidding parties to offer it a system that all Of the vendors knew was both
bizarre and expensive. But none of them had any incentive to suggest to the
Department that its specifications should be reformulated. Or take the IRS. It
contracted for the replacement of main frame computers at its service centers
with a vendor whose equipment would meet the bench test specifications that
the IRS had published, but which the vendor knew had too little capacity for
the services' long term needs. Or take the Environmental Protection Agency.
It discovered too late that it was being used as a training ground for inexperi-
enced vendor managers and technical personnel who were transferred elsewhere
as soon as they achieved the capacity to do EPA any real good with its com-
puter problems.
The question, of course, is why are these vendors so uncooperative in
dealing with federal agency buyers? Or to put the matter another way, why
are the federal agencies involved doing such a bad job of protecting themselves
from vendor abuse? Aren't these just cases in which the government has been
stupid?
In a superficial sense the answer to the last question is "yes." In all of these
cases something was wrong with the agency's specification of its contract
requirements. But, Kelman's point is more fundamental. The agencies involved
will never be able to specify contracts that are sufficient to protect them against
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their own inexperience and lack of information concerning complex systems,
particularly systems involving a rapidly evolving technology. They must rely
on the vendors and the vendor community for information and continuing
assistance. But, given the way in which the government contracts with these
vendors, it can neither consult with them informally before contracting, in order
to let them tell it what it really needs, nor can it reward vendors for good
performance by promising to continue to deal with them. The open competition
system discourages, if it does not quite prohibit, both sorts of activities.
Given the emphasis on equity and integrity in the procurement system, the
reasons for this discouragement are not hard to find. If vendors are allowed to
participate in the process of specifying what the government needs, it is much
easier for them to work with sympathetic or even corrupt officials to rig or
"wire" specifications to produce a contract for a particular vendor. Similarly,
if the government procurement process heavily weighs experience with existing
vendors, and rewards those who have provided good support and service in the
past with new contracts, it necessarily limits or excludes open competition by
others. Indeed, one contract manager told Kelman that refusal to give prior
contractors any benefit for prior good performance was a measure of how
"objective" the agency was in awarding contracts.
While the government eschews informal relationships with vendors and
spreads its business around through its bidding process, Kelman finds that it
is much more common in private industry to have continuous liaison between
buyers and sellers and to stick with a particular supplier unless or until disap-
pointed by its performance. While government procurement officers try to purge
their procurement decision processes of reliance on "experience" and other soft
variables like "managerial effectiveness," private firms use general reputation
and their "feel" for vendor personnel as very important elements in the deter-
mination of where to buy. When purchasing computer equipment in particular,
private firms view the vendor's advice as crucial to the development of sensible
specifications of their own requirements, and they expect vendors to guide them
in reshaping their operations to get the best fit between computer capacity and
other business systems.
As Kelman shows, the theoretical economic literature predicts the emer-
gence of these sorts of long-term, intensely-cooperative arrangements where
goods and services have a highly specific relationship to the structure, func-
tions, or locations of the parties involved. The value created by continuous
exchange of information and the interdependencies created by that exchange
lead firms in such circumstances to engage in open textured, long term con-
tracting and "sole source" relationships, if not outright merger. These forms of
contracting are, however, anathema in the government procurement world.
To be sure Kelman does not find that all government procurement officers
fail, either to take experience into account, or to learn from vendors before
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specifying what it is that the government wishes to buy. The point rather is that
both the rules and the culture of public contracting make such managers fight
an uphill, and sometimes clandestine, battle to get computer systems and other
complex equipment and services that will enable their agencies to do their jobs
well. It is this systematic bias against excellence. in public management that
Kelman fmds most blameworthy in the current procurement process.
The causes of government failure here are not, however, a simple story of
public managers failing to heed the wisdom developed by their counterparts in
the private sector. The public managers who deal with the procurement of
complex products for federal agencies are subject to quite different demands
than their counterparts in private firms. As the subtitle of Kelman's book
suggests, the crucial difference between the environment of public management
and the environment of private management is the American public's historic
distaste for discretionary governmental power. While we exalt entrepreneurship
and creativity in the private sector, we prefer our public officers to be carefully
constrained both by detailed rules and structural checks and balances. While
in private business a few kickbacks to buyers may be a sensible cost to pay for
a procurement system that permits the exercise of both common sense and
creativity, the calculus of cost and benefits in the public sector is quite differ-
ent. Incidents of fraud and waste in procurement have demoralizing effects with
respect to the whole of government's activities, and they reinforce a distrust
of government operations that is so central to our constitutional heritage as to
function almost as a civic religion.
Moreover, the modem federal government has taken a major role in the
promotion of economic opportunity for all Americans. Fair access to the
procurement activities of the federal government is not just an aspect of our
general belief that all citizens are entitled to equal treatment by the government.
It is also a means of promoting social ideals such as increased opportunities
for historically disadvantaged groups and the maintenance of a robust small-
business sector. Government procurement activity is much more than buying
things in order to carry out prescribed governmental tasks. Procurement must
conform to basic political ideals and playa part in governmental social policy
as well.
It is not too surprising, therefore, that the procurement system strongly
emphasizes norms that may limit the degree to which procurement can be
employed in a strictly instrumental fashion to promote excellence in the perfor-
mance of agency missions. As Kelman is at pains to point out, Americans are
both intensely proud and intensely nervous about their government. Our
government is meant to live up to ideals that transcend the ideals of the market
place, but, as Kelman puts it, "the statutes, regulations, and cultural norms that
govern the procurement system reflect the view that, left to their own devices,
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government officials will not live up to the ideals we hold."l We therefore
insist that there are rules and procedures through which we can hold govern-
ment officials strictly accountable for their behavior. Thus, the procurement
system that we have is not some silly aberration brought about by the lack of
bottom line accountability on the part of government bureaucrats. It is a system
responsive both to our constitutional heritage and to the day to day politics of
a system structured to produce continuous oversight. Both the press and the
Congress are likely to be more interested that a government procurement officer
went to lunch with a potential vendor than that she learned something at that
lunch that might be crucial to the design of a request for proposals for a multi-
million dollar computer system.
II. Seeking a Cure
While he takes the prevention of corruption and unfairness in the pro-
curement process very seriously, Kelman nevertheless believes that we should
radically reorient the structure of federal procurement. In his words "the basic
principle ... should be to increase dramatically the freedom we give public
officials to use their judgment in the procurement process.,,2 In short, we must
somehow free ourselves of our fear of discretion or, more particularly, we must
give up those techniques for limiting discretion that produce dysfunctional
results.
Rather than meticulous objective rules which separate procurement officials
from vendors, limit informal information flow, and stamp out long-term rela-
tionships that create value, Kelman favors a system based on broad principles
whose protections against fraud and incompetence would be built into the
structure of procurement decisionmaking. In particular, he would create
accountability through the requirement of written decisions justifying and
providing a rationale for any procurement judgment. And, he would guard
against corruption by making all procurement decisions through the medium
of multiple-member evaluation panels. Coziness and chicanery would be subject
to peer-control in the decision process and subsequent oversight of decision
rationales. The process would thus function something like informal notice and
comment rulemaking in federal agencies. Participation, potentially, would
remain broad; ex parte or informal contacts would be recorded; and, prudence
and probity would be reinforced by the necessity of public explanation.
Moreover, Kelman believes that procurement officials should be encouraged
to use more discretionary standards, particularly the past performance of
potential vendors. The requirement of explanation would police against these
1. S. KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PuBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE FEAR OF DISCRETION AND THE
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 13 (1990) [hereinafter by page number].
2. P.90.
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soft variables as a mere subterfuge for favoritism. Answering potential critics
concerned primarily with equity, Kelman argues that the use of experience
factors is not a form of discrimination against new firms. Parties would be both
advantaged and disadvantaged by prior performance. Moreover, the current
system fails to recognize that new entrants are themselves often advantaged in
the bidding process by flexibility and technical innovativeness, which would
still be important aspects of bidding on complex or high technology systems.
Although Kelman is hardly sanguine that his proposals would stamp out
all corruption and incompetence, while promoting procurement activity that
supports excellence in the performance of agency missions, he argues quite
cogently that no system should be compared with an ideal one. After all, the
current system of rulishness, which stamps out creativity and discourages
sensible acquisition and utilization of information, is also inadequate to prevent
all or identify much corruption. Most of the corruption found in government
procurement in recent years has been uncovered, not by following the elaborate
paper trail produced by government red tape, but by inside tips or focused
investigations.3 These tools for combating waste and corruption would remain
available under Kelman's proposal.
III. The Cultural Overhang
As I have said, Kelman makes a persuasive case both for his view of the
real maladies of federal procurement policy and for his proposed cures. The
current exemption of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation from most procurement regulatory requirements has
already created a natural experiment that Kelman believes supports his views.
A broader, but still limited, trial would seem feasible and sensible.
Yet, I remain quite dubious that the structural changes suggested are
sufficient to the task of reorientation. In part these doubts are premised on my
own understanding of the federal rulemaking process. But, more importantly,
they are premised on my intuitions about the power of the existing political and
legal culture and on Kelman's failure to explore and explain the "procurement
culture" to which he often refers.
To take the rulemaking process first, Kelman's proposals are quite reminis-
cent of the reform proposals of the late 1960s.4 The reformers of that period
3. Pp. 97-98.
4. See. e.g., Shapiro, The Choice ofRulemaking or Adjudication in the Development ofAdministrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965) (suggesting that greater rulemaking authority would allow agencies
to develop policy in a more coherent and fonhright fashion). See also R. MELNICK, REGULAnON IN THE
COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 5-9 (1983) (describing "new regulation" of late 19605 and
early 19705); Stewan, Vennont Yankee and the Evolution ofAdministrative Procedure 91 HARV. L. REV.
1804-11 (1978) (discussing burdens of trial types proceedings that led federal agencies to tum to rulemaking
process).
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pointed to a stodgy federal regulatory process that was oriented toward ineffi-
cient case by case adjudication and was mired in technicalities that caused it
to lose sight of the major goal of regulatory systems-the development of
successful public policy. There were, of course, many other failures of regula-
tory adjudication: Expense, delay, and capture by repeat players-usually the
industry targeted for regulation. The system was also arcane and therefore little
subject to political oversight.
The remedy proposed then, and often adopted in the regulatory statutes of
the 1970s and 1980s, was a rulemaking process that required agencies to
confront policy issues directly and to resolve them. The statutory framework
for these rulemaking activities provided standards or criteria for the develop-
ment of rules, but left specific policy development to the expert judgment of
administrators informed by a broadly participatory rulemaking process. Control
of agency discretion was to be based on review of the agency's rationale for
its policy judgments. This would permit both political oversight in the Congress
and judicial review for legality.
In practice, the rulemaking process of federal regulatory agencies has hardly
lived up to our aspirations. Agency after agency has been faulted for the
hypertechnicality of its rules, its failure to address the important policy concerns
within its jurisdiction, and its dilatoriness in doing anything about those prob-
lems it does address. It is hard to find analysts who view the rulemaking efforts
of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, or the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration as major success stories.
The principal problem with regulatory rulemaking, as David Harfst and I
have argued recently,S has been the intrusion of that same political and legal
culture that Kelman identifies early in his discussions of the development of
procurement policy. Having empowered agencies to make policy by rule, the
legal and political system immediately set about the task of constraining that
discretion. The Congress acted both generally and specifically. It adopted a
multitude of general procedural statutes imposing onerous decisional obligations
on all or most agency rulemaking. The Government in the Sunshine Act, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Intergovernmental
Cooperation Act, not to mention the Freedom of Information Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act, have all insisted that agencies devote
significant resources to the pursuit of goals other than those directly within their
central missions.6 Congress further constrained exercises of agency discretion,
first by attaching numerous legislative veto provisions to federal regulatory
5. J. MASHAW AND D. HARpST, THE STRUGGLE POR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
6. On the general statutory environment of federal administrative decisionmaking see J. MASHAW AND
R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PuBLIC SYSTEM 48-63 (2d ed. 1985).
517
HeinOnline -- 8 Yale J. on Reg. 518 1991
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 8: 511, 1991
statutes, and, when that activity was ruled unconstitutional,1 by micro-
management through appropriations riders.
Meanwhile the executive branch got into the same act with an almost
religious fervor. It regulated the regulators through OMB reporting and clear-
ance requirements for major regulatory policies and through the imposition of
elaborate requirements for agenda development and publication.s The courts,
as ever the guardians of individual liberties from governmental abuse of
discretion, "proceduralized" the rulemaking process in ways that gave signifi-
cant, if not oveJwhelming, advantages to opponents of agency policy making.
The result of all these efforts to control regulatory discretion has been a
regulatory quagmire. The general political and legal culture has strongly
reinforced agency incentives for caution and inaction and done little to promote
vigor, creativity or excellence.
The question, then, is what would protect a restructured procurement
process from the same dynamic of excessive constraint? I confess that I cannot
tell, for Kelman's book tells me too little about the internal culture of procure-
ment activities and the way that culture is related to the external environmental
within which procurement activity takes place. But, if we presume that this
culture is of the standard fonn, that is, a set of nonns or operating guides that
have been found to be functional in the relevant environment, then we
obviously need to know a lot about that environment. Only then might we be
able to tell how a shift of the sort that Kelman proposes would reorient the
environmental sanction and reward structure faced by procurement managers.
For it is on the basis of that structure that new cultural norms will emerge.
To be sure, not everything can be pursued in a single volume. But the
failure to devote more detailed attention to the determinants of the procurement
culture is made troubling by the repeated invocation of "culture" as an explana-
tion for procurement practice. Kelman often recognizes that the rules to which
procurement managers are subject do not demand that they behave in all the
dysfunctional ways in which he finds them behaving. There are other things
in the environment that are shaping procurement choices. But, we are not told
with any specificity what they are or how they would be reshaped by the
structural and decision process changes that Kelman proposes.
If, therefore, the environmental factors shaping the procurement culture are
the same or analogous to the political and legal factors that have shaped and
constrained federal agency rule'making, we may not get very far by instituting
Kelman's refonns. But then again we might. Environments and cultures are
both complex and specific, robust and fragile. Apparently small changes can
7. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
8. The principal executive orders implemented by a host of OMB regulatory provisions include: Exec.
Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13, 193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 473-76 (1988); Exec. Order
No. 12,498,50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), reprinted in 5U.S.C. § 601 at 476-77 (1988).
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reorient incentives in ways that break deadlock and foster the pursuit of
excellence for which Kelman ardently argues. Hence, while his analysis fails
to give us all of the materials from which we could confidently predict success,
he still makes a persuasive case for some li~ted experiments. After all, given
the current (and perhaps permanent) state of organization theory, we cannot do
much better than to avoid the mistakes of the past while putting in place new
institutional mechanisms that are themselves recognized'to be tentative efforts
at learning by doing.
519
HeinOnline -- 8 Yale J. on Reg. 520 1991
